跪求暗网 第一季2016年上映的由Lauren Terp主演的在线免费播放资源
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提取码: vjr1
《暗 网 第一季 Dark Net Season 1》
导演: Mati Kochavi
主演: Lauren Terp、Kristie、Drew、Anisha Vora、Yusuke、Akari Uchida
类型: 纪录片
制片国家/地区: 美国
语言: 英语
首播: 2016-01-21(美国)
季数: 12
集数: 8
单集片长: 30分钟
A documentary series that explores the furthest reaches of the internet and the people who frequent it, Dark Net provides a revealing and cautionary look inside a vast cyber netherworld rarely witnessed by most of us.
【Vicky's电影/电视剧推荐】解除好友2：暗网 Unfriended: Dark Web
网络在带给我们便利的同时，也改变着我们的生活，这其中的暗黑与暴力，也只有置身其中的我们最能懂。作为一个恐怖片怂货，Vicky保证这一部里没有鬼，但观影全程都让我紧张到要窒息。电影一经推出就火爆网络，目前豆瓣评分7.8，好于95%的恐怖片。
《解除好友 Unfriended》 的第一部以 「网络暴力」 为主题，讲述一群键盘侠在把一名少女逼死后，如何遭受 亡魂报复，逐一处死 。虽说这部的口碑和质量都很一般，但其独特的拍摄手法还是引得我身边一群朋友拍手称赞。同时，我强烈建议键盘侠们都去看一下这部片子，毕竟夜路走动了还是会见鬼的。
我们今天要看的第二部，则以神秘的 「暗网」 为主题，揭露互联网深处最暗黑的一面。两部片子各自独立，没有直接关联，观众即使没有看过第一部，也丝毫不会影响第二部。
这一部延续上一部的拍摄手法，整部片子都将以录屏的方式呈现。后面所有的离奇故事，都将在这一块发光的荧屏上发生。电影开篇是我们都熟悉得不能再熟悉的电脑屏幕界面，男主角很自然地切换操作Facebook、Message和Google，大家可以自动脑补成微博、微信和百度。
男主 Matias 和他的几个朋友们一起视频聊天的时候说，他刚换了台新电脑，二手市场买的。很奇怪的是，系统总是时不时出现崩溃/卡屏。男主一查才发现，看似空白的硬盘里，其实有着大量的隐藏文件，里面全是一些非正规途径拍摄的生活中的小视频。
在好奇心的驱使下，男主打开了名为Account（账户）的隐藏文件夹中一个叫 The River 的未知软件。随后他便进入了一个界面非常古朴的聊天室，列表上全是叫Charon的人，从Charon 1排到Charon N。一脸懵逼的他和朋友们共享了自己的桌面，技术宅的朋友说，这大概就是传说中的暗网。
让我们来看下维基百科上关于暗网的定义： 暗网（英语：Dark web） 是存在于黑暗网络上的万维网内容，只能用特殊软件、特殊授权、或对计算机做特殊设置才能访问，使用一般的浏览器和搜索引擎找不到暗网的内容。暗网的服务器地址和数据传输通常是匿名、匿踪的。
如果以经典的冰山作为比喻的话，我们日常能见到的表面网站只占4%，而不可见的暗网占据了96%。由于其隐蔽和不可追踪的特性，暗网成为了非法交易的天堂。这里有毒品、军火、洗钱，人口买卖、儿童色情服务、雇凶杀人等各种为法律所不容的罪恶。犯罪分子可以借助黑客技术隐匿身份、抹除轨迹，而比特币等虚拟货币的诞生，更让暗网交易变得便利和难以追踪。
虽然说好奇心害死猫，但是好奇心同样是人类追求刺激最原始的欲望我在。男主虽然隐隐地感觉事情不太对，但还是选择打开了隐藏文件里面的名为 「Contribution」 的子文件夹。令他惊讶的是，里面有数百个杀人视频。
里面的女子有些被铁链绑住，有的被浇灌强腐蚀性液体，有的被关在汽油桶里。最新的一个视频，是女生在自己家里熟睡，有个黑衣男子悄无声息的进入她的房间在她身边徘徊。男主和他的朋友们都吓坏了，他们的直觉是这些视频绝不是捏造的。
就在这个时候，一个似乎是「买家」身份的 Charon68 发来信息，说自己对上次的作品很满意，希望这次能 「动作更加慢一些，效果更加强烈一些」 。
名叫Charon68的用户提到了一个词： 环锯术
Vicky搜索了一下维基百科： 头部穿孔（Trepanation） ，又称颅骨穿孔术或环锯术，是一种外科手术干预法。在头皮与头盖骨上钻或挖一个孔，令到头颅的硬膜外露，以处理颅内疾病或其他相关的健康问题。在十八世纪的欧洲，头部穿孔是一种民间疗法，用来治疗精神病或其他与头脑相关的病变。但由于缺乏科学依据，这项手术慢慢被现代医学所鄙弃。
Charon68表示如果往里面塞东西，如果放进去的东西是活的并且保证女孩子能看到这一切，他可以再加钱。男主为了确保他们不是在恶作剧，上网搜索了这个女孩的名字，发现了有关她的寻人启事。很明显，这个女孩是他们下一个目标。
就在这时候，这台电脑的原主人Charon4发来消息，要求男主立刻归还电脑。原来，男主的电脑并不是如他所说从二手市场买来的，而是摆在他所兼职的失物招领处的。此刻，Charon4已经身在男主女朋友的家里，并站在在电脑前与自己对话的了女友的小姨子身后。
通常这个时候，我们应该老老实实的归还电脑，但是我们的男主就是要花式作死。他打开了对方的比特币账户（电脑里的所有账户都是自动填充密码的），一口气全转到了自己名下。他威胁Charon4必须保证女友以及视频中女孩的生命安全，才能把钱都还给他。
他的清零账户的举动引起了The River「护盾」的注意，接下来电影呈现了落到黑客手中的N种死法。在观影的过程中，Vicky曾经中途暂停在家里翻箱倒柜的找贴纸，把手头的MacBook、ipad和iPhone前置摄像头都遮挡住，实在是太可怕了！
电影到了接近尾声的时候，我曾经想过要是男主不要那么贪心，不要去碰失物招领处的电脑，或者在Charon4要求他归还电脑的时候，他不要去动那些比特币，又或是他不要那么多的好奇心去探究隐藏文件夹，在发现一切不对劲的时候立刻断网，是不是就不会害朋友连带自己全都被杀死。
但影片的结尾却告诉我们，一切都是策划好的。从男主连上网的那一刻起，一切都只是照着预设的剧本在往下走。这根本不是一场意外或偶然，这台电脑是被故意留在那里的。简单来说，即使男主没有去碰那台电脑，游戏玩家们依然有办法让他进入游戏变成猎物。
写在最后：
年初时候韩国的一部 《昆池岩》 虽然引起了不小的观影热潮，但不得不承认的是，伪纪录片发展至今似乎已处于瓶颈期。当观众已经不太容易被一卷“实拍”录像带吓到的时候， 《解除好友》 终于打开了一个新思路。
惊悚片的故事“如何讲”的重要性大于故事“是什么”， 《活埋》 当年的成功就是个很好的例子。毕竟，电影从剧情上想要有很多新意和突破都不那么容易，观众观影某些程度上来说是想要满足自己关于刺激的诉求。当一部电影结束后，观众有觉得爽到，那么就值回了票价。
（本篇完）
喜欢影视剧、美食和旅行的天秤座80后妹纸，喜欢一切新奇温暖的事物
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WSM是什么意思
WSM是基于web的系统管理程序。
wsm是web-based system manager的简称，它是基于web的系统管理程序,它是一个客户到服务器方式的图形化程序，它的图形界面可以使用户管理本地系统和远程系统。
wsm提供一个全面的系统管理环境它比smit管理的任务还要多一些，你可以按照三种方法使用wsm。
扩展资料：
2015年对于暗网市场来说是一个分水岭，该年3月份，一家名为进化的暗网市场进行了一次大规模的Exit Scam，在窃取了用户以及商户托管的价值1200万美元的比特币后，直接关停运营。
而后接棒市场领头羊之位的是黑行和Agora两家暗网市场，但前者在同年5月以网站维护的名义暂停几日后，同样携款跑路。
接连发生的平台跑路事件和用户与商户的舆论压力，使得各家平台不得不调整自己的托管方式和运营模式。
WSM正是在这种背景下，于2016年诞生，上线伊始，它就尝试着引入了一些新的机制，支持门罗币以加强交易的隐私性。
上线Multisig的比特币托管模式，与传统的平台托管模式并存，降低客户与商户资金被平台裹挟而逃的风险。
它还设立了深度FAQ版块，为客户理解其平台提供帮助，此外，它还在Dread、Reddit上请专员来为客户和商户处理问题，并且维护平台与外界的公共关系。
参考资料来源：百度百科—wsm
读英语～暗网HowDutchPoliceTookOverHansa,aTopDarkWebMarketWIRED
For anyone who has watched the last few years of cat-and-mouse games on the dark web's black markets, the pattern is familiar: A contraband bazaar like the Silk Road attracts thousands of drug dealers and their customers, along with intense scrutiny from police and three-letter agencies. Authorities hunt down its administrators, and tear the site offline in a dramatic takedown—only to find that its buyers and sellers have simply migrated to the next dark-web market on their list.
️️️️️️️️️️️️️️️️️️️So when Dutch police got onto the trail of the popular dark-web marketplace Hansa in the fall of 2016, they decided on a different approach: Not a mere takedown, but a takeover.
In interviews with WIRED, ahead of a talk they plan to give at Kaspersky Security Analyst Summit Thursday, two Netherlands National High Tech Crime Unit officers detailed their 10-month investigation into Hansa, once the largest dark-web market in Europe. At its height, Hansa's 3,600 dealers offered more than 24,000 drug product listings, from cocaine to MDMA摇头丸 to heroin, as well as a smaller trade in fraud tools and counterfeit伪造 documents. In their probe into that free-trade zone, which would come to be known as Operation Bayonet, the Dutch investigators not only identified the two alleged所谓的 administrators of Hansa's black market operation in Germany, but went so far as to hijack the two arrested men's accounts to take full control of the site itself.
'We thought maybe we could really damage the trust in this whole system.'
Marinus Boekelo, NHTCU
The NHTCU officers explained how, in the undercover work that followed, they surveilled监控 Hansa's buyers and sellers, discreetly altered the site's code to grab more identifying information of those users, and even tricked dozens of Hansa's anonymous sellers into opening a beacon file信标文件on their computers that revealed their locations. The fallout of that law enforcement coup, the officers claim, has been one of the most successful blows against the dark web in its short history: millions of dollars worth of confiscated bitcoins没收的比特币, more than a dozen arrests and counting of the site's top drug dealers, and a vast database of Hansa user information that authorities say should haunt anyone who bought or sold on the site during its last month online.
"When a dark market is taken down, everyone goes to the next one. It's a whack-a-mole effect," says Marinus Boekelo, one of the NHTCU investigators who worked on the Hansa operation. By secretly seizing control of Hansa rather than merely unplugging it from the internet, Boekelo says he and his Dutch police colleagues aimed not only to uncover more about Hansa's unsuspecting users, but to deal a psychological blow to the broader dark-web drug trade. "We thought maybe we could really damage the trust in this whole system," he says.
While the Hansa takeover at times involved the close cooperation of American and German law enforcement, neither the US Department of Justice nor the German Federal Criminal Police Office responded to WIRED's requests for comment, leaving some elements of the NHTCU's account without independent confirmation. What follows is the Dutch police's own, candid description of their experience digging into—and ultimately running—one of the world's top online narcotics trafficking operations.
Pulling Loose Threads
Despite its dramatic turns, the Hansa investigation started in a traditional fashion: with a tip. Security researchers believed they had found a Hansa server in the Netherlands data center of a web-hosting firm. (Security firm BitDefender has claimed some involvement in the Hansa operation. But the NHTCU declined to reveal the name of the security company or the web-hosting firm, along with several other details they say they're keeping under wraps to protect methods and sources. Even the names of the two German men charged with running Hansa remain secret, since German law protects the names of prosecuted individuals until their trial.)
As Boekelo tells it, the security firm had somehow found Hansa's development server, a version of the site where it tested new features before deploying them in the live version that handled its formidable load of thousands of visits from drug shoppers every day. While the live Hansa site was protected by Tor, the development server had somehow been exposed online, where the security firm discovered it and recorded its IP address.
Gert Ras (left) and Marinus Boekelo (right).
Manuel Velásquez Figueroa
The Dutch police quickly contacted the web host, demanded access to its data center, and installed network-monitoring equipment that allowed them to spy on all traffic to and from the machine. They immediately found that the development server also connected to a Tor-protected server at the same location that ran Hansa's live site, as well as a pair of servers in another data center in Germany. They then made a copy of each server's entire drive, including records of every transaction performed in Hansa's history, and every conversation that took place through its anonymized messaging system.
Even that massive security breach shouldn't have necessarily exposed any of the site's vendors or administrators, since all of Hansa's visitors and admins used pseudonyms, and sites protected by Tor can only be accessed by users running Tor, too, anonymizing their web connections. But after poring through the contents of the servers, the police found a major operational slip-up: One of the German servers contained the two alleged founders' chat logs on the antiquated messaging protocol IRC. The conversations stretched back years, and amazingly, included both admins' full names and, for one man, his home address.
Setting the Trap
Hansa's two suspected admins, the Dutch cops had discovered, were across the border in Germany—one 30-year-old man in the city of Siegen, and another 31-year-old in Cologne. But when the NHTCU contacted the German authorities to request their arrest and extradition, they discovered the pair were already on the radar of German authorities, and under investigation for the creation of Lul.to, a site selling pirated ebooks and audiobooks.
That gave the Dutch investigators an idea: Perhaps they could use the existing German investigation as cover for their own operation, letting the German police nab their suspects for e-book piracy and then secretly taking over Hansa without tipping off the market's users. "We came up with this plan to take over. We could use that arrest," says Gert Ras, the head of the NHTCU. "We had to get rid of the real administrators to become the administrators ourselves."
Just as the NHTCU's elaborate trap started to take shape, however, it was also falling apart: The Hansa servers the Dutch cops were watching suddenly went silent. Ras and Boekelo say they suspect that their copying of the servers somehow tipped off the site's admins. As a result, they had moved the market to another Tor-protected location, shuffling it in Tor's vast deck of anonymized machines around the globe. "That was a setback," Ras says.
Even then, remarkably, the Dutch cops didn't simply cut their losses, ask the Germans to arrest Hansa's administrators, and likely used clues from their computers to find the site's servers and shut them down. Instead, they decided to stick with their stealthy takeover plan, and spent the ensuing months poring over evidence—even as the site continued its brisk narcotics trade—in an attempt to locate the Hansa servers again and quietly hijack them. Finally in April 2017, they got another lucky break: The alleged administrators had made a bitcoin payment from an address that had been included in those same IRC chatlogs. Using the blockchain analysis software Chainalysis, the police could see that payment went to a bitcoin payment provider with an office in the Netherlands. And when the police sent that bitcoin payment firm a legal demand to cough up more information, it identified the recipient of that transaction as another hosting company, this time in Lithuania.
Two For One
Not long after pinpointing those servers for the second time, the NHTCU learned of another surprising windfall: The FBI contacted them to tell them that they'd located one of the servers for AlphaBay, the world's most popular dark-web drug market at the time—far larger than Hansa—in the Netherlands. American investigators were closing in and wanted to pull the plug, just as the Dutch were planning to commandeer Hansa.
The Dutch police quickly realized that after AlphaBay was shut down, its refugees would go searching for a new marketplace. If their scheme worked, AlphaBay's users would flood to Hansa, which would secretly be under police control. "Not only would we get this effect of undermining the trust in dark markets, we'd also get this influx of people," Ras says. They'd be able to surveil a far larger portion of the dark-web economy, he says, and instill a sense in users that there was nowhere to hide. Even fleeing to another marketplace wouldn't let them escape law enforcement's reach.
With the pieces of the takeover plan in place, the Dutch police sent a pair of agents to the Lithuanian data center, taking advantage of the two countries' mutual legal assistance treaty. On June 20, in a carefully timed move designed to catch the two German suspects at the keyboard, the German police raided the two men's homes, arrested them, and seized their computers with their hard drives unencrypted. The Germans then signaled the Dutch police, who immediately began the migration of all of Hansa's data to a new set of servers under full police control in the Netherlands.
"We coordinated with the Germans, so that when they busted in the door we immediately started our action," says Boekelo. "We didn’t want to have any downtime."
Under questioning in a German jail, the two men handed over credentials to their accounts, including the Tox peer-to-peer chat system they had used to communicate with the site's four moderators. After three days, Hansa was fully migrated to the Netherlands and under Dutch police control. No users—or even those moderators—appeared to have noticed the change.
Total Control
For the next month, the Dutch police would use their position at the top of Europe's largest dark-web market to pull off increasingly aggressive surveillance of its users. They rewrote the site's code, they say, to log every user's password, rather than store them as encrypted hashes. They tweaked a feature designed to automatically encrypt messages with users' PGP keys, so that it secretly logged each message's full text before encrypting it, which in many cases allowed them to capture buyers' home addresses as they sent the information to sellers. The site had been set up to automatically removed metadata from photos of products uploaded to the site; they altered that function so that it first recorded a copy of the image with metadata intact. That enabled them to pull geolocation data from many photos that sellers had taken of their illegal wares.
The administrators' internal control panel for Hansa, showing a list of disputed sales that had been escalated from the site's four moderators.
NHTCU
As they tell it, the police eventually became so brazen that they staged a fake server glitch that deleted all the photos from the site, forcing sellers to re-upload photos and giving Dutch authorities another chance to capture the metadata. That ruse alone snagged the geolocated coordinates of more than 50 dealers.
In perhaps its most intrusive move of all, the NHTCU says it essentially tricked users into downloading and running a homing beacon. Hansa offered sellers a file to serve as a backup key, designed to let them recover bitcoin sent to them after 90 days even if the sites were to go down. The cops replaced that harmless text document with a carefully crafted Excel file, says Boekelo. When a seller opened it, their device would connect to a unique url, revealing the seller's IP address to the police. Boekelo says that 64 sellers fell for that trap.
Throughout the trickery, Hansa thrived under the NCHTU's secret control. The undercover agents had studied the logs of the real admins' conversations with their moderators and the site's users long enough to convincingly impersonate them, Ras and Boekelo say. In fact, a whole team of officers took turns impersonating the two admins, so that when disputes between buyers and sellers escalated beyond the moderators' authority, undercover agents were ready to deal with them even more efficiently than the real admins had. "The quality really went up," says Ras. "Everyone was very satisfied with the level of service they got."
Springing the Trap
That competence also made Hansa the natural destination when AlphaBay suddenly winked out of existence in early July of last year. As drug buyers became impatient, eventually more than 5,000 a day of them flocked to Hansa, eight times the normal registration rate, the NHTCU says—all of whom immediately fell under police surveillance.
One week after Alphabay first went down, the Wall Street Journal reported that the site's servers had been seized in a law enforcement raid and that its founder, Canadian Alexandre Cazès, had apparently committed suicide in a Thai prison. The news threw the dark web community into chaos. The resulting flood of Alphabay refugees became so large that the NHTCU shut down new registrations for ten days. The police were bound by Dutch law to track and report every transaction occurring on the site under their control to Europol; with roughly 1,000 illegal transactions occurring every day on their watch, the paperwork was becoming unmanageable.
After AlphaBay's shutdown, users poured into Hansa, which was under the Dutch police's full control.
NCHTU
During their time as black market administrators, the Dutch police only banned one product on Hansa: the highly dangerous opioid Fentanyl. All other drugs on the site continued to flow freely, a circumstance over which Ras and Boekelo seem surprisingly unconflicted. "They would have taken place anyway," says Ras without hesitation, "but on a different market."
After 27 days and about 27,000 transactions, however, the NHTCU decided to hang up its ledger. It unplugged Hansa, replacing the site with a seizure notice and a link to the NHTCU's own Tor site showing a list of identified and arrested dark-web drug buyers and sellers. "We trace people who are active at Dark Markets and offer illicit goods or services," the site read. "Are you one of them? Then you have our attention."
Fallout
The Dutch police came away from their Hansa takeover with concrete rewards: They obtained at least some data on 420,000 users, including at least 10,000 home addresses, which they've turned over to Europol to be distributed to other police agencies around Europe and the world. Since the takedown, Ras says, they've arrested a dozen of Hansa's top vendors, with more arrests planned for coming weeks. They seized 1,200 bitcoins from Hansa, worth about $12 million by today's exchange rates. Since Hansa used bitcoin's multi-signature transaction function to protect funds from police seizure, that confiscation was only possible because the NHTCU had taken over the site and sabotaged its code to disable that feature during Hansa's last month online.
The Dutch police say they've also performed roughly 50 "knock-and-talks," in-person visits to buyers' homes to let them know they've been identified by their dark-web drug purchases, though they say only one high-volume buyer has been arrested so far. "We want people to be aware," says Ras. "We have the data. It's here, and it's not going away."
'Everyone was very satisfied with the level of service they got.'
Gert Ras, NHU
As for the operation's impact on the overall drug trade, the police point to a study by the Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research, which found that the Hansa hijacking did have a significantly different outcome from previous dark-web takedowns. While most drug vendors who fled AlphaBay showed up soon after on other dark web drug sites, those who fled Hansa didn't—or if they did, they recreated their online identities thoroughly enough to escape recognition. "Compared to both the Silk Road takedowns, or even the AlphaBay takedown, the Hansa Market shut down stands out in a positive way," the report reads. "We see the first signs of game-changing police intervention."
Other dark-web trackers aren't so sure. Nicolas Christin, a researcher at Carnegie Mellon, says it's tough to measure the long-term impact of the Hansa operation, as drug buyers and sellers still flock to alternative sites like Dream Market, the new top dark-web drug site after Hansa and AlphaBay's desmise, and even to invite-only sites created by individual sellers. "I think in the short term, it created a lot of upheaval," Christin says. "Whether it was sustained, I really don't know."
As for Hansa's users themselves, opinion seems split. "Looks like I'll be sober for a while. Not trusting any markets," one user wrote on Reddit's darknet-focused forum the day the Hansa takedown was announced last summer.
But some insisted that the dark web would bounce back, even from the most elaborate sting operation it had ever seen. "Things will stabilize, they always do," that anonymous user wrote. "The Great Game of whack-a-mole never ends."
Caught in the Dark Web
If you thought the Hansa story was intense, wait until you read about how Silk Road went down
Also, anyone paying for drugs online with bitcoin should know they may not have covered their tracks as well as they thought
When AlphaBay and Hansa both went offline, the dark web descended into chaos
This story has been updated to include BitDefender's claim of involvement.
我浏览暗网（Dark Web）时，被盯上了！
先分享一个 quora 上面，网友 DK Thomas 关于暗网的事：
这是一个令人紧张的故事，有一次我在暗网浏览页面，突然我的打印机自己打印了一张纸，我是相当奇怪，期初我觉得这张纸平平无奇，没什么特别的，但是当我仔细反反复复查看，我发现在这张纸的顶部有一行字（在这之前我根本不知道我的打印机能打出这么小的字），上面写着：look out the window, I'm watching you（看窗外，我正在注视着你）.我吓坏了，拔下电脑和打印机的线，重新安装操作系统等程序。
当然了，我慢慢地看着窗外，我非常清晰的记得自己所在的位置，任何人都不可能在窗外，这外面只有狗、围栏、山顶、树。在我浏览网页的那个时间点，绝不会有人在窗外。
细思极恐！
（原文： Has anything scary or creepy happened to you when accessing the dark Web? ）
什么是暗网（Dark Web）？
臭名昭著的丝绸之路贩卖各种违禁药、毒品、枪支，暗网也确实有一些非法的网站存在。
问题来了，暗网应不应该被取缔呢？
究竟谁来取缔？
美国政府支持开发了暗网，特别是国务院和国家科学基金会都参与其中。政府资助它是为了帮助并保护极权主义国家的活动家，同时作为在他国获取信息的途径。
技术上能否取缔？
技术上很难实现，它运行在遍布全球的服务器和节点上，并受到非常强大的加密技术的保护。
暗网简单来说就是通过多重代理实现加密，代理节点遍布世界，像洋葱一样层层包裹用户，让追踪者无从下手，也正因为它的匿名性，神秘的暗网靠它空前地壮大。
是否该被取缔？
人们有时候会用暗网做一些非法的事情。但同样，人们有时候也会用电话来做非法的事情啊。难道我们就应该取缔电话么？
归根到底，这也只是一个工具，一个渠道，我们应该把目标锁定在那些非法的使用者而不是这个网络。
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