读英语～暗网HowDutchPoliceTookOverHansa,aTopDarkWebMarketWIRED
For anyone who has watched the last few years of cat-and-mouse games on the dark web's black markets, the pattern is familiar: A contraband bazaar like the Silk Road attracts thousands of drug dealers and their customers, along with intense scrutiny from police and three-letter agencies. Authorities hunt down its administrators, and tear the site offline in a dramatic takedown—only to find that its buyers and sellers have simply migrated to the next dark-web market on their list.
️️️️️️️️️️️️️️️️️️️So when Dutch police got onto the trail of the popular dark-web marketplace Hansa in the fall of 2016, they decided on a different approach: Not a mere takedown, but a takeover.
In interviews with WIRED, ahead of a talk they plan to give at Kaspersky Security Analyst Summit Thursday, two Netherlands National High Tech Crime Unit officers detailed their 10-month investigation into Hansa, once the largest dark-web market in Europe. At its height, Hansa's 3,600 dealers offered more than 24,000 drug product listings, from cocaine to MDMA摇头丸 to heroin, as well as a smaller trade in fraud tools and counterfeit伪造 documents. In their probe into that free-trade zone, which would come to be known as Operation Bayonet, the Dutch investigators not only identified the two alleged所谓的 administrators of Hansa's black market operation in Germany, but went so far as to hijack the two arrested men's accounts to take full control of the site itself.
'We thought maybe we could really damage the trust in this whole system.'
Marinus Boekelo, NHTCU
The NHTCU officers explained how, in the undercover work that followed, they surveilled监控 Hansa's buyers and sellers, discreetly altered the site's code to grab more identifying information of those users, and even tricked dozens of Hansa's anonymous sellers into opening a beacon file信标文件on their computers that revealed their locations. The fallout of that law enforcement coup, the officers claim, has been one of the most successful blows against the dark web in its short history: millions of dollars worth of confiscated bitcoins没收的比特币, more than a dozen arrests and counting of the site's top drug dealers, and a vast database of Hansa user information that authorities say should haunt anyone who bought or sold on the site during its last month online.
"When a dark market is taken down, everyone goes to the next one. It's a whack-a-mole effect," says Marinus Boekelo, one of the NHTCU investigators who worked on the Hansa operation. By secretly seizing control of Hansa rather than merely unplugging it from the internet, Boekelo says he and his Dutch police colleagues aimed not only to uncover more about Hansa's unsuspecting users, but to deal a psychological blow to the broader dark-web drug trade. "We thought maybe we could really damage the trust in this whole system," he says.
While the Hansa takeover at times involved the close cooperation of American and German law enforcement, neither the US Department of Justice nor the German Federal Criminal Police Office responded to WIRED's requests for comment, leaving some elements of the NHTCU's account without independent confirmation. What follows is the Dutch police's own, candid description of their experience digging into—and ultimately running—one of the world's top online narcotics trafficking operations.
Pulling Loose Threads
Despite its dramatic turns, the Hansa investigation started in a traditional fashion: with a tip. Security researchers believed they had found a Hansa server in the Netherlands data center of a web-hosting firm. (Security firm BitDefender has claimed some involvement in the Hansa operation. But the NHTCU declined to reveal the name of the security company or the web-hosting firm, along with several other details they say they're keeping under wraps to protect methods and sources. Even the names of the two German men charged with running Hansa remain secret, since German law protects the names of prosecuted individuals until their trial.)
As Boekelo tells it, the security firm had somehow found Hansa's development server, a version of the site where it tested new features before deploying them in the live version that handled its formidable load of thousands of visits from drug shoppers every day. While the live Hansa site was protected by Tor, the development server had somehow been exposed online, where the security firm discovered it and recorded its IP address.
Gert Ras (left) and Marinus Boekelo (right).
Manuel Velásquez Figueroa
The Dutch police quickly contacted the web host, demanded access to its data center, and installed network-monitoring equipment that allowed them to spy on all traffic to and from the machine. They immediately found that the development server also connected to a Tor-protected server at the same location that ran Hansa's live site, as well as a pair of servers in another data center in Germany. They then made a copy of each server's entire drive, including records of every transaction performed in Hansa's history, and every conversation that took place through its anonymized messaging system.
Even that massive security breach shouldn't have necessarily exposed any of the site's vendors or administrators, since all of Hansa's visitors and admins used pseudonyms, and sites protected by Tor can only be accessed by users running Tor, too, anonymizing their web connections. But after poring through the contents of the servers, the police found a major operational slip-up: One of the German servers contained the two alleged founders' chat logs on the antiquated messaging protocol IRC. The conversations stretched back years, and amazingly, included both admins' full names and, for one man, his home address.
Setting the Trap
Hansa's two suspected admins, the Dutch cops had discovered, were across the border in Germany—one 30-year-old man in the city of Siegen, and another 31-year-old in Cologne. But when the NHTCU contacted the German authorities to request their arrest and extradition, they discovered the pair were already on the radar of German authorities, and under investigation for the creation of Lul.to, a site selling pirated ebooks and audiobooks.
That gave the Dutch investigators an idea: Perhaps they could use the existing German investigation as cover for their own operation, letting the German police nab their suspects for e-book piracy and then secretly taking over Hansa without tipping off the market's users. "We came up with this plan to take over. We could use that arrest," says Gert Ras, the head of the NHTCU. "We had to get rid of the real administrators to become the administrators ourselves."
Just as the NHTCU's elaborate trap started to take shape, however, it was also falling apart: The Hansa servers the Dutch cops were watching suddenly went silent. Ras and Boekelo say they suspect that their copying of the servers somehow tipped off the site's admins. As a result, they had moved the market to another Tor-protected location, shuffling it in Tor's vast deck of anonymized machines around the globe. "That was a setback," Ras says.
Even then, remarkably, the Dutch cops didn't simply cut their losses, ask the Germans to arrest Hansa's administrators, and likely used clues from their computers to find the site's servers and shut them down. Instead, they decided to stick with their stealthy takeover plan, and spent the ensuing months poring over evidence—even as the site continued its brisk narcotics trade—in an attempt to locate the Hansa servers again and quietly hijack them. Finally in April 2017, they got another lucky break: The alleged administrators had made a bitcoin payment from an address that had been included in those same IRC chatlogs. Using the blockchain analysis software Chainalysis, the police could see that payment went to a bitcoin payment provider with an office in the Netherlands. And when the police sent that bitcoin payment firm a legal demand to cough up more information, it identified the recipient of that transaction as another hosting company, this time in Lithuania.
Two For One
Not long after pinpointing those servers for the second time, the NHTCU learned of another surprising windfall: The FBI contacted them to tell them that they'd located one of the servers for AlphaBay, the world's most popular dark-web drug market at the time—far larger than Hansa—in the Netherlands. American investigators were closing in and wanted to pull the plug, just as the Dutch were planning to commandeer Hansa.
The Dutch police quickly realized that after AlphaBay was shut down, its refugees would go searching for a new marketplace. If their scheme worked, AlphaBay's users would flood to Hansa, which would secretly be under police control. "Not only would we get this effect of undermining the trust in dark markets, we'd also get this influx of people," Ras says. They'd be able to surveil a far larger portion of the dark-web economy, he says, and instill a sense in users that there was nowhere to hide. Even fleeing to another marketplace wouldn't let them escape law enforcement's reach.
With the pieces of the takeover plan in place, the Dutch police sent a pair of agents to the Lithuanian data center, taking advantage of the two countries' mutual legal assistance treaty. On June 20, in a carefully timed move designed to catch the two German suspects at the keyboard, the German police raided the two men's homes, arrested them, and seized their computers with their hard drives unencrypted. The Germans then signaled the Dutch police, who immediately began the migration of all of Hansa's data to a new set of servers under full police control in the Netherlands.
"We coordinated with the Germans, so that when they busted in the door we immediately started our action," says Boekelo. "We didn’t want to have any downtime."
Under questioning in a German jail, the two men handed over credentials to their accounts, including the Tox peer-to-peer chat system they had used to communicate with the site's four moderators. After three days, Hansa was fully migrated to the Netherlands and under Dutch police control. No users—or even those moderators—appeared to have noticed the change.
Total Control
For the next month, the Dutch police would use their position at the top of Europe's largest dark-web market to pull off increasingly aggressive surveillance of its users. They rewrote the site's code, they say, to log every user's password, rather than store them as encrypted hashes. They tweaked a feature designed to automatically encrypt messages with users' PGP keys, so that it secretly logged each message's full text before encrypting it, which in many cases allowed them to capture buyers' home addresses as they sent the information to sellers. The site had been set up to automatically removed metadata from photos of products uploaded to the site; they altered that function so that it first recorded a copy of the image with metadata intact. That enabled them to pull geolocation data from many photos that sellers had taken of their illegal wares.
The administrators' internal control panel for Hansa, showing a list of disputed sales that had been escalated from the site's four moderators.
NHTCU
As they tell it, the police eventually became so brazen that they staged a fake server glitch that deleted all the photos from the site, forcing sellers to re-upload photos and giving Dutch authorities another chance to capture the metadata. That ruse alone snagged the geolocated coordinates of more than 50 dealers.
In perhaps its most intrusive move of all, the NHTCU says it essentially tricked users into downloading and running a homing beacon. Hansa offered sellers a file to serve as a backup key, designed to let them recover bitcoin sent to them after 90 days even if the sites were to go down. The cops replaced that harmless text document with a carefully crafted Excel file, says Boekelo. When a seller opened it, their device would connect to a unique url, revealing the seller's IP address to the police. Boekelo says that 64 sellers fell for that trap.
Throughout the trickery, Hansa thrived under the NCHTU's secret control. The undercover agents had studied the logs of the real admins' conversations with their moderators and the site's users long enough to convincingly impersonate them, Ras and Boekelo say. In fact, a whole team of officers took turns impersonating the two admins, so that when disputes between buyers and sellers escalated beyond the moderators' authority, undercover agents were ready to deal with them even more efficiently than the real admins had. "The quality really went up," says Ras. "Everyone was very satisfied with the level of service they got."
Springing the Trap
That competence also made Hansa the natural destination when AlphaBay suddenly winked out of existence in early July of last year. As drug buyers became impatient, eventually more than 5,000 a day of them flocked to Hansa, eight times the normal registration rate, the NHTCU says—all of whom immediately fell under police surveillance.
One week after Alphabay first went down, the Wall Street Journal reported that the site's servers had been seized in a law enforcement raid and that its founder, Canadian Alexandre Cazès, had apparently committed suicide in a Thai prison. The news threw the dark web community into chaos. The resulting flood of Alphabay refugees became so large that the NHTCU shut down new registrations for ten days. The police were bound by Dutch law to track and report every transaction occurring on the site under their control to Europol; with roughly 1,000 illegal transactions occurring every day on their watch, the paperwork was becoming unmanageable.
After AlphaBay's shutdown, users poured into Hansa, which was under the Dutch police's full control.
NCHTU
During their time as black market administrators, the Dutch police only banned one product on Hansa: the highly dangerous opioid Fentanyl. All other drugs on the site continued to flow freely, a circumstance over which Ras and Boekelo seem surprisingly unconflicted. "They would have taken place anyway," says Ras without hesitation, "but on a different market."
After 27 days and about 27,000 transactions, however, the NHTCU decided to hang up its ledger. It unplugged Hansa, replacing the site with a seizure notice and a link to the NHTCU's own Tor site showing a list of identified and arrested dark-web drug buyers and sellers. "We trace people who are active at Dark Markets and offer illicit goods or services," the site read. "Are you one of them? Then you have our attention."
Fallout
The Dutch police came away from their Hansa takeover with concrete rewards: They obtained at least some data on 420,000 users, including at least 10,000 home addresses, which they've turned over to Europol to be distributed to other police agencies around Europe and the world. Since the takedown, Ras says, they've arrested a dozen of Hansa's top vendors, with more arrests planned for coming weeks. They seized 1,200 bitcoins from Hansa, worth about $12 million by today's exchange rates. Since Hansa used bitcoin's multi-signature transaction function to protect funds from police seizure, that confiscation was only possible because the NHTCU had taken over the site and sabotaged its code to disable that feature during Hansa's last month online.
The Dutch police say they've also performed roughly 50 "knock-and-talks," in-person visits to buyers' homes to let them know they've been identified by their dark-web drug purchases, though they say only one high-volume buyer has been arrested so far. "We want people to be aware," says Ras. "We have the data. It's here, and it's not going away."
'Everyone was very satisfied with the level of service they got.'
Gert Ras, NHU
As for the operation's impact on the overall drug trade, the police point to a study by the Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research, which found that the Hansa hijacking did have a significantly different outcome from previous dark-web takedowns. While most drug vendors who fled AlphaBay showed up soon after on other dark web drug sites, those who fled Hansa didn't—or if they did, they recreated their online identities thoroughly enough to escape recognition. "Compared to both the Silk Road takedowns, or even the AlphaBay takedown, the Hansa Market shut down stands out in a positive way," the report reads. "We see the first signs of game-changing police intervention."
Other dark-web trackers aren't so sure. Nicolas Christin, a researcher at Carnegie Mellon, says it's tough to measure the long-term impact of the Hansa operation, as drug buyers and sellers still flock to alternative sites like Dream Market, the new top dark-web drug site after Hansa and AlphaBay's desmise, and even to invite-only sites created by individual sellers. "I think in the short term, it created a lot of upheaval," Christin says. "Whether it was sustained, I really don't know."
As for Hansa's users themselves, opinion seems split. "Looks like I'll be sober for a while. Not trusting any markets," one user wrote on Reddit's darknet-focused forum the day the Hansa takedown was announced last summer.
But some insisted that the dark web would bounce back, even from the most elaborate sting operation it had ever seen. "Things will stabilize, they always do," that anonymous user wrote. "The Great Game of whack-a-mole never ends."
Caught in the Dark Web
If you thought the Hansa story was intense, wait until you read about how Silk Road went down
Also, anyone paying for drugs online with bitcoin should know they may not have covered their tracks as well as they thought
When AlphaBay and Hansa both went offline, the dark web descended into chaos
This story has been updated to include BitDefender's claim of involvement.
章颖莹被报道可能沦为性奴，可能性有多大？
首先，个人认为几乎没有这种可能，因为她遇到的是变态杀人狂，不是色情魔。章莹颖从小到大一直都是“别人家的孩子”，本科是中山大学，硕士是北大，案发时章莹颖是去美国交流学习的，她在联系房东看房子的路上失踪了，那段时间好几个留学生都遭遇了伤害，所以在联系不上章莹颖之后，这条新闻很快就上了热搜，随后她的父母和男朋友都曾赶赴美国寻找章莹颖，后来美国FBI都介入了，才查到其是被人绑架了。
其次，警方在章莹颖失踪后不久就推测她已经遇害了，案子被破之后章莹颖也确实是被杀害了，而不是其他。章莹颖在和房东约定好看房的时候上了一辆陌生的车子，这两车的车主就是凶手里斯滕森，这是她最后一次出现在监控里面，美国警方一直是在搜救章莹颖的，但是毫无消息，还被里斯滕森给骗过去了，其实通俗地说就是“活不见人，死不见尸”，在搜寻无果之后，基本上可以认为她失踪不久之后就遇害了。
再者，凶手克里斯滕森就是个变态，他早已有了杀人或者自杀的想法。实际上后来案子破了之后，章莹颖也确实早就遇害了，不然克里斯滕森不会那么容易就骗过警方。克里斯滕森本来也是个高材生，但是不知道为什么突然成绩一落千丈，而且还开始酗酒，随后感情上面也遇到了挫折，在其绑架杀害章莹颖的前两个月，他还寻求了心理医生的帮助，坦露过自己有杀人或者自杀的想法，并且他电脑里面有相关的搜索记录，克里斯滕森就是个变态杀人狂，不是色情魔。
最后，章莹颖案已经破获了，而且凶手也已经绳之于法了，个人认为就不要在为了好奇心无端猜测什么了。章莹颖是一个十分优秀的女孩子，她的不幸遭遇让我们大家都很心痛，她的父母、亲朋好友尤为心痛，死者为大，而且章莹颖明显是遇到了杀人狂，不是色情魔，案子很清晰，且已经过去很久了，个人觉得就不要再无端猜测什么了。
还是下手了 美国出动特工没收10亿比特币
根据美国司法部的消息，联邦特工在本周查获了价值超过10亿美元的比特币，这些比特币与已经被关闭的网站“丝绸之路”有关（丝绸之路是一个暗网中的非法黑市，从事军火、毒品交易、洗钱和人口贩卖等非法活动），这是美国司法部有史以来规模最大的一次加密货币缉获活动。
此次收缴的比特币共计69370枚，目前每一枚比特币的市场价值都超过了15000美元，这些比特币被没收之后将全数上缴给美国联邦政府。这些比特币均属于丝绸之路的创始人罗斯·乌尔布里希特，此人在2013年10月被FBI逮捕，并且在2015年2月因洗钱、贩毒和黑客行为被判处无期徒刑。
在2013年时FBI就已经查封了乌尔布里希特手中的比特币，但是这些比特币又被隶属于丝绸之路的一名黑客窃取，此后FBI一直在追查这批比特币的下落。令人想不到的是，当年这些比特币总价值仅为1400万美元，每一枚比特币价值刚刚超过200美元，而现在这笔比特币涨了几十倍。
在此时收缴这么一大笔比特币，感觉美国司法部是有意为之。其实比特币背后一直有美国作为积极的推手，其创始人名字中本聪的另一层含义其实就是美国中央情报局，如果没有美国情报部门的全力支持，那么像丝绸之路这样暗网当中的超级黑市是根本不可能开起来的。美国情报部门借助网络成功将比特币打造成了黑暗世界的通用货币，并且与美元体系掌控世界经济一样，利用比特币来掌控非法地下市场。
比特币的安全性受到了犯罪分子和富人的青睐，美国已经率先承认了比特币的合法性，将比特币视为与黄金一样的合法避险资产，这就为许多人转移财产或者洗钱大开方便之门，这才是比特币价值飞涨的主要原因。
现在因为新冠疫情美国经济遭到了重创，所有的资产在危机面前都不堪一击，如果金融危机袭来，那么包括黄金和比特币在内的所有资产都会被抛售，今年因为新冠疫情已经出现了两次抛售潮，因此比特币的价值并不稳定。
可能是看到了这一点，美国政府决定“收网”，准备在高位将这些根本一文不值的虚拟资产套现，没收这些比特币就是个典型例子。依照美国情报部门的技术完全可以防止这些比特币失窃，但是这些比特币很有可能就是“监守自盗”，依靠炒作坐等这些比特币在黑市当中继续升值。
非正常人类研究中心
“头儿，干嘛呢？”苏菲拿着一罐咖啡，靠在档案柜旁边，疑惑的看着陈子昂着急忙慌的找着资料，嘴里还时不时的在嘟囔着什么。
苏菲这是这个月第五次，看到头儿这样的，明明一个文弱不堪的人，性子却偏偏得如此“活泼”。
“快！帮我查一下这个！”陈子昂从一堆厚厚的资料中抽出两三张拍在苏菲的胸上，完全地忘记了男女之别，等他发觉那触感有些不大对劲时苏菲手上的罐子已然变形，他甚至觉得那易拉环下一秒就会弹起来崩在他的脸上。
陈子昂不自觉的动了动手，那柔软弹时的触觉蔓延开来，“女性胸部大小是否与力量大小成正比”的课题在陈子党的脑子中和易拉环逐渐的交替而来，而薛未开门便看到了这幕。
“……”因为一时的寂静无声，并且薛未默默后退一步，动了动嘴，似乎想说些什么，但又忍住了。默默地关上了门，静等着陈子昂的惨叫。
“嗷！！苏菲！！！我是你领导！！我要扣你工资！！！”
“嗷！！我错了！我这不是把你当兄弟了吗…！别打脸！！”
“苏姐，苏姐！错啦！”
“爹！！你是我亲爹！！别打了！！”
……
薛未靠在门上，扬起一抹不易察觉的微笑，闭眼听着，等屋内安静了，他默数了30个数，再推门进去，直接苏菲站在镜子前，优雅地擦着口红，而陈子昂头埋在了沙发里。薛未皱了皱眉，给陈子昂从沙发里揪了出来，看着那乌青的嘴角眉头皱的更紧了，冲着苏菲说道，
“下次…别打脸，他是门面，不好看。”
“行，未哥，下次我专挑他的老二打～”
“……”这时候的陈子昂和薛未突然感到胯下一凉。
苏菲补完妆，风情万种的撩了撩头发扭着腰又是一个人间尤物，丝毫看不出刚才揍人的样子，陈子昂扯了扯嘴角，一脸的无语，只不过虽然她现在是一副性感女神的样子，但是只有他们二人才知道眼前的这个女人有多厉害，苏菲捡起地上的资料，瞳孔一缩。
“头儿，这件事儿上面不是不让查了吗？”
而此时的陈子昂却在研究薛未身上的结构，不时的啧啧称赞。在薛未第六遍红着脸在脑海中演练如何把他礼貌的扔出去时，苏菲已经拿起了一把折叠椅，仿佛因为太重而不趁手，她又翻抽屉拽出了个棒球棍，踩着高跟鞋，“哒哒哒”走到薛未身前，一把把陈子昂拎了出来，而在陈子昂被拎出来的时候，他还忍不住的戳了戳薛未的胸肌。
“哇…好棒…”一声赞叹，还未结束，已经被忍无可忍的苏菲拽了出去，登时，又是一阵鸡飞狗跳。
而在12楼，正在办案的警员淡定地拂了拂警帽上飘落的灰，撑起一把伞，而当楼上三人真正坐好时，气氛却又陡然一变。
“头儿查到了这个案子总共消失了四个人，都是k大的学生。其中有两名在校生是先行失踪，而后两名博士生确实在答辩赛之前一起失踪，是由他们的导师报案的。在失踪前都曾在极乐酒吧附近出现过，我们的警员去勘察过了，并未发现有什么异样，而且这个极乐酒吧……”苏菲犹豫了，下，抬眼看向坐在主位沙发上的陈子昂，薛未坐在他的另一侧，背挺得直直的，坐姿十分端正。
“怎么了？继续。”陈子昂把玩着手术刀，而手术刀反射着陈子昂金丝眼镜的光芒。
“从头到尾，在警员探访的过程中，酒吧老板并未出现过，但经理却异常配合，甚至说…有些主动。”苏菲说着，将一份资料传到了他们三个人的小群里，他们三个人的手机及ip地址受国家保护，且有苏菲这个世界顶尖的黑客修改防火墙，国家也无法进行全方位监督。
“未哥，你先去健身吧，剩下的我和苏菲整理。”陈子昂打了个哈欠，伸了伸懒腰，将薛未连扯带拽的拖出了门“记得带份肯德基全家桶回来，我要变态辣鸡翅！”说完便毫不留情的甩上了门。
薛未站在门口默然站立，整个13楼只有这一间办公室，偶尔有楼下警员送案子过来存放档案，看到门口的薛未，便开始窃窃私语。
“你看这个傻大个儿又被他们排挤了，这三个人好像来闹着玩儿的，局长还拿这么重要的案子交给他们，肯定得搞砸了，最后还得灰溜溜的调任。”
“话不能这么说，怎么说人家两个国际有名呢？咱们这些普通人啊～可比不得！”
正当二人说的起劲的时候，却突然噤声，因为他们看到薛未正在一步一步的向他们走来，多年的特种兵生涯，身上的血气让薛未平添了几分煞气，一米九二的个子刚实在两名不到一米八的警员跟前，带来了极重的压迫感。可薛未只是瞟了一眼他们就走开了，两人刚松了一口气，还未开口讥讽，便听到他的声音传来。
“你们可以说我，可若是让我听到你们说他们两个的任何一句坏话，我会让你们后悔，来到这里。”
两个小警员立马不敢多做动作，赶紧跑去取资料，薛未皱着的眉才略微放松了一点，大步踏向步梯，步行下楼，他容不得别人说他们两个有任何不好，陈子昂和苏菲，给了他第二次生命。
从他14岁参军成为特种兵，再到成为弃子，他用了17年的青春，换来了这一身本领与伤，他从未光明正大的获取功勋，去后在最后一次的国际暗杀中被同伴一枪打在了胸口，他反手用手枪爆了同伴的头后，才绝望的发现自己被出卖了。他只记得最后杀出重围时，晕倒在陈子昂面前。还有句女人的声音，“这么大，怎么拖回去？”
虽然，他确实被拖了回去。那时候的陈子昂和苏菲在美国情报局工作，却毅然选择回国。陈子昂大学时在美国主修心理学，并担任了美国极乐园精神病院的院长被美国fbi称为“君主”，而苏菲则领着黑客创下的十大暗网搜罗人才，美国不愿二人走，可二人却选择绕路偷渡，碰巧捡到了身负重伤的薛未，当年也才20出头的陈子昂，被称为医学界绝无仅有的天才，他在手术方面很疯，所以基本上敢让他手术的人，除非身患重病无法医治，否则他也没怎么碰到过正常的病人，而这次恰好好捡到薛未，并以他为实践实行了第二次手术，他们救了他，并照顾着他，等三人归国时，薛未不愿再回到军队，17年的封闭式生涯，使他无法像常人一样进行交流，便与他二人组成了一个小组，由国家情报局任命。
他们这个小组专门负责各地的诡案，美名其曰“退休生活”。
薛未很信任他们两个陈子昂也觉得很有趣，毕竟薛未作为他第二个手术的病人，他那样重伤情况下的身体状态以及现在恢复的速度，值得让他好好研究。三个人吵吵闹闹，过了一年，也生出了不少情分。而在外人眼中，他们三人却是非正常的人类。
他们三个在各自的领域，是天才，也是疯子。
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